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Abstract 
In this paper, I investigate whether companies with high quality accounting information carry out 
preemptive corporate restructuring or not. I find the higher the quality of accounting information, the 
more proactive the corporate restructuring for the following reasons. First, Board of Directors 
overseeing the management basically identifies the financial position and performance of the entity 
through accounting information, it will encourage the management to make preemptive restructuring 
decisions when it is necessary to improve its operating performance or improve its financial structure 
through corporate restructuring such as the sale of assets, interests, affiliates and business units. 
Second, high-quality accounting information will play a role in enhancing possibility of completion of 
corporate restructuring. This finding suggests that high quality of accounting information was required 
as a determinant that could enhance the practicability of preemptive restructuring. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate restructuring refers to adjusting the size of a business through the sale of assets, interests, 
affiliates and business units. Corporate restructuring concentrates the core competencies of the entity 
through the specialisation of the business, which may lead to an increase in the value of the entity. In 
Korea, the foreign exchange crisis has led to the restructuring of domestic companies, mainly 
financially troubled companies. However, when an entity is in financial trouble, the value of the entity 
rapidly declines over time, so it is difficult to expect a positive effect on the value of the entity if it 
carries out the restructuring after the detection of the financial difficulties. Thus, even before financial 
difficulties are detected, it is necessary for an entity to carry out preemptive restructuring for reasons 
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such as improving its financial structure due to the repayment of a liability, securing investment funds 
in a new investment meeting, improving its operating performance and securing liquidity. 
Therefore, this paper was based on the importance of entering into proactive restructuring before the 
entity becomes insolvent. However, it is difficult for management to make preemptive restructuring 
because there are few reasons for the decision to reduce the size of the company through restructuring 
such as the sale of shares and asset sales. This is because, in relation to the issue of agency problem 
between management and shareholders, the management intends to avoid downsizing the company 
through corporate restructuring because it has an incentive to expand the company to increase private 
profits, such as power or prestige, through the expansion of the size of the entity (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 
1990). However, companies with high quality accounting information are expected to carry out 
preemptive restructuring for the following reasons. First, the management may avoid corporate 
restructuring due to the agent problem, but if the quality of the accounting information is high, the 
monitoring role of the management is strengthened, and if restructuring is needed to maximize the 
value of the enterprise, preemptive restructuring can take place even before a bad sign is detected. 
Because the Board of Directors overseeing the management basically identifies the financial position 
and performance of the entity through accounting information, it will encourage the management to 
make preemptive restructuring decisions when it is necessary to improve its operating performance or 
improve its financial structure through corporate restructuring. Second, high-quality accounting 
information will play a role in enhancing possibility of completion of corporate restructuring. In the 
event of corporate restructuring, the proceeds from the sale of an asset or an interest are determined 
through a valuation of the asset to be sold. The valuation of the assets to be sold is performed not only 
by the sale entity but also by the purchase entity, which often results in a delay or failure to sell because 
of differences in the proceeds of the sale between the two companies. The reason for disagreement with 
the proceeds of the sale is the difference in the valuation of the asset for sale, which arises when 
uncertainty is high about the future cash flows of the asset. Dechow (1994) and Subramnayam (1996) 
showed that the accrual of accounting information provides useful information when predicting future 
cash flows. Consequently, the valuation of the asset is basically performed through accounting 
information, and if the quality of the accounting information is low, it is difficult to estimate the future 
cash flows, which makes it difficult for a purchase entity to measure the value of the asset or interest. 
That is, because of the increasing uncertainty about the entity’s future performance distribution, the 
buyer firm would lower the purchase price as a compensation for uncertainty, which could be an 
unacceptable amount of proceeds from the sale for restructuring firms. These disagreements over the 
proceeds between the purchase firm and sale entity reduce the likelihood of the completion of the 
restructuring. However, the higher the quality of the accounting information, the less uncertainty about 
the future cash flows of the entity’s assets to be sold, the less disagreement between the selling entity 
and the buying entity, which increases the likelihood of the asset being sold. 
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This study analyzed preemptive restructuring of listed Korean companies from 2006 to 2013. 
Preemptive restructuring was defined as an asset sale and a sale of more than 20 percent of an equity 
interest, even though it was not financially troubled. Financial difficulty was determined by the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the entity. I found that the higher the quality of accounting information, the more 
proactive the corporate restructuring. In other words, the quality of high accounting information is a 
determinant of preemptive restructuring. A company needs preemptive restructuring in order to solidify 
its value, even if it is not financially in a difficult position. Such preemptive restructuring, which is 
essential to the entity, is avoided by the management’s agent problem and also results in a delay or 
failure to complete the corporate restructuring process due to disagreement over valuation of the assets 
to be sold between purchase firm and sale firm. However, this study shows that entities with a high 
quality of accounting information tend to carry out more preemptive restructuring because of their 
effective monitoring role and easier valuation of the assets sold. This paper demonstrated the need for a 
high quality of accounting information as an essential requirement to increase the feasibility of 
preemptive restructuring, which is important for the long-term survival and growth of the enterprise.  
Section 2 presents prior study and the hypotheses and Section 3 presents the details of the sample and 
research design. Section 4 describes the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Prior Study and the Hypotheses  
2.1 Prior Study 
(1) Financial Reporting Quality 
Accounting information becomes an important source of information for investors (Bushman & 
Indjejikian, 1993). Accounting information is used by shareholders to monitor management (Bushman 
& Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001). According to Dechow (1994) and Subramnayam (1996), Accruals 
provide useful information for predicting future cash flows. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) showed that 
the quality of accounting information increases investment efficiency and increases expected cash 
flows through a model that considers the quality of accounting information and its relevance to cash 
flows. Healy and Palepu (2001) and Bushman and Smith (2001) also reported that accounting 
information with high quality increases the investment efficiency of a firm. This is because the higher 
the quality of accounting information, the less market friction such as moral hazard and reverse 
selection, the more efficient the investment. 
Lim et al. (2015) who studied the quality of accounting information and mergers and acquisitions, a 
large-scale corporate investment activity, found that high quality of accounting information of the 
acquiree in mergers and acquisitions increases the acquisition performance of the acquired entity. This 
is because the high quality of the accounting information of the acquiree reduces uncertainty about the 
future value of the acquiree and therefore results in appropriate purchase payments. De Franco et al. 
(2011) showed that if an auditor of an acquiree is a large auditor, the discount on the proceeds of the 
sale of the acquiree would decrease, thereby increasing the proceeds of the sale. Accounting 
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information audited by large auditors transparently reflects the financial position and management 
performance of the entity, thereby reducing the discount phenomenon by reducing the information 
asymmetry between the acquired and the acquiree. 
In summary, the preceding studies show that a high quality of accounting information can reduce 
information asymmetry and reverse selection costs for an investor or purchaser. From the perspective 
of a selling company, it can be seen that high quality accounting information can reduce the discount of 
the proceeds from the sale of the assets it sells so that selling firm receives the appropriate proceeds 
from the sale. 
(2) Corporate Restructuring 
Previous research on corporate restructuring can be categorized under three main themes. First, it is 
related to finding out the determinants of corporate restructuring. Rosenfeld (1984) suggested that an 
entity has an incentive to sell assets to improve operating efficiency and performance, and it seeks to 
eliminate the synergistic effects of negative sales. Park and Paik (2009) showed that companies with 
large scale, high systemic risks, lack liquidity and high debt ratios tend to do corportate restructuring 
such as disposition of securities and shares, sales of assets in real estate, business sectors, factories, etc. 
Second, there are a lot of previous studies related to the performance of corporate restructuring. Lang et 
al. (1995) showed that companies with low performance or high debt ratios receive a positive response 
in the stock market when they sell assets for debt repayment due to improved liquidity. Park and Paik 
(2009) showed that factors such as corporate size, liquidity index, systemic risk, chaebol ownership 
status, debt ratio, major shareholder interest rate and foreign equity ratio had a significant positive 
relationship to the restructuring disclosure effect and long-term performance. John and Ofek (1995), 
Schlingmann, Stulz and Walking (2002) report positive for firm value when they focus their core 
competencies on selling assets. Kim and Park (1999) stated that if an entity sells an asset for the 
purpose of focusing its business, it is positive to the value of the corporate. 
Third, prior research on corporate restructuring has been conducted only by workout or court 
receivership companies. Kim et al. (2013) assessed the performance of corporate restructuring by using 
management indicators such as capital return and economic value added for companies that applied for 
court receivership or workout, and there was continuous improvement in the management performance 
of restructuring companies for five years after the restructuring was carried out. Park and Lee (2017) 
examined earnings mamangement using arruals for the workout and court receivership companies after 
corporate restructuring. In a workout company, earnings management using accruals were observed 
less than those of the court-managed companies. This is because the workout companies have a lower 
degree of insolvency when they apply for a workout and will be more strictly monitoring their 
management during corporate restructuring. 
The differences between these prior studies and this study are as follows. First, this study seeks to 
analyse whether the quality of accounting information serves as a determinant of corporate 
restructuring. Park and Lee (2017) is a leading research that analyzes the quality of accounting 
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information and the relevance of corporate restructuring, which focuses on changes in the quality of 
accounting information after restructuring, not on analysis of the quality of accounting information as a 
determinant of restructuring. 
Second, existing studies have been much of a sample of financially troubled companies such as 
workout and court receivership. However, this study targeted companies that conducted preemptive 
corporate restructuring through disposition of securities and holding equity, sale of property, plant and 
equipment, business department sales before it became financially difficult.  
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
The separation of ownership and management of the entity creates an agent problem between the 
shareholders and the management. Information asymmetry between shareholders and management 
results in hidden actions and moral hazard for managers. Moral hazard is a phenomenon in which 
managers put efforts into pursuing the private interests of managers rather than increasing shareholders’ 
wealth. The agent problem damages the corporate value by producing inefficiency in corporate 
management.  
Prior studies explain that managers have an incentive to seek corporate expansion. The manager wants 
to increase the size of the company to promote his private utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
addition, management conducts mergers and acquisitions to secure greater decision-making rights for 
controllable resources and reputations (Jensen, 1986). Some point out that this is related to the 
ostentatious tendency to focus on appearance rather than on inner reality, and that this is because the 
management is inherently inclined to the direction of empire building (Schumpeter, 1934; Marris, 
1964). Moreover, these managers’ desire for corporate growth is related to the size of the company and 
the compensation of the management (Murphy, 1985; Sanders, 2001).  
However, in some cases, reducing the size of an entity is necessary to maximize its value. Companies 
should cope with changes in economic conditions and technology by expanding or downsizing (Coase, 
1937). For reasons such as improving the financial structure due to repayment of liabilities, securing 
investment funds for new investment meetings, improving operating performance and securing 
liquidity, the entity needs to carry out restructuring through asset sales, equity sales and corporate 
restructuring in advance, even before the entity can detect bad signs. However, the management will 
want to avoid corporate restructuring to reduce the size of the company because it has a desire to 
expand it. Therefore, the board of directors overseeing the management should be able to induce the 
management to make corporate restructuring decisions if restructuring is necessary to maximize the 
value of the business. At this time, accounting information is an integral part of the management’s 
monitoring role. This is because accounting information is an important source of information for an 
entity for investors (Bushman & Indjejikian, 1993) and is used by shareholders to monitor management 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Lambert, 2001). Higher-quality earnings reports provide more information 
about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a 
specific decision-maker (Dechow et al., 2010). The Board of Directors, which oversees the 
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management, also basically assesses the current status of the entity through accounting information, 
and a high quality of the accounting information enables the entity to correctly assess its financial 
position and management performance. Therefore, the board of directors of a company with high 
quality accounting information could encourage management to make corporate restructuring decisions 
if it is deemed necessary for the entity to carry out a preemptive restructuring even before a financial 
failure is detected. 
H: The higher the accounting information quality of the firm, the higher the likelihood of 
preemptive corporate restructuring. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design  
3.1 Sample Description 
A sample of corporate restructuring in this study is an entity that attempted to preemptively restructure 
itself from 2006 to 2013 by disposing of its holdings as announced in the market and selling assets of 
real estate, business units and factories in Korea. This study excluded companies that had been subject 
to restructuring in the form of workout and court receivership. Preemptive corporate restructuring 
samples were extracted through the S&P Capital IQ database. The financial data were obtained from 
the Kis-Value database. In addition, financial industry entities whose financial statements are different 
from other industries were excluded from the sample. To select a controlled firm, 1:1 matching was 
selected based on the total asset and liability ratio using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods, as 
in Lawrence et al. (2011) and Lennox et al. (2012). Finally, the samples used in this study were 741 
preemptive corporate restructuring firms and 741 controlled firms as provided in Table 1. It shows a 
general increase in the number of acquisitions until 2008, sharp decreases in 2009, and increases again 
after 2010. 
 
Table 1. Sample Distribution  
Year Preemptive Coporate 
Restruturing Firms 
Control Firms All firms 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2007 32 4.32 101 13.63 133 8.97 
2008 70 9.45 114 15.38 184 12.42 
2009 64 8.64 97 13.09 161 10.86 
2010 90 12.15 101 13.63 191 12.89 
2011 138 18.62 119 16.06 257 17.34 
2012 176 23.75 99 13.36 275 18.56 
2013 171 23.08 110 14.84 281 18.96 
total 741 100  741 100  1482 100  
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3.2 Measurement of Accounting Information Quality 
The independent variable of this study is the quality of accounting information. I adopt 
performance-matched discretionary accruals according to the method of Kothari et al. (2005), which is 
a re-modified version of the modified Jones model. They argue that discretionary accruals are affected 
by firm performance and therefore include ROA (return on assets) as a variable in the modified Jones 
model. A discretionary accruals is a measure of earnings management of a firm, and a higher level of 
discretionary accruals can mean a higher level of earnings management, thus lowering the quality of 
accounting information. A discretionary accruals are measured by residual from Equation (1). I 
multiply residuals from Equation (1) by −1 so that this variable increases accounting information 
quality increases, as described in Equation (2).  
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where tTA Net income－cash flow from operations; 
tS Sales revenue; 
tAR Accounts receivable; 
tPPE Plant, property, and equipment; 
tROA Net income/total assets; and 
tA Total assets. 
AQi,t = εi,t                                        (2) 
where 
AQ = Accounting informaiton Quality 
ε = residual from Equation (1) 
3.3 Empirical Models 
The following equation (3) was established to verify the hypothesis in this study that The higher the 
accounting information quality of the firm, the higher the likelihood of preemptive corporate 
restructuring. Logistic regression was performed because the dependent variable consisted of two 
categories, whether to carry out preemptive restructuring or not. Here, the variable of interest is the 
quality of the accounting information (AQ), and β2 is expected to be a positive (+) value if the 
hypothesis is adopted. 
Pre_Restructuring i,t = β1 + β2 AQ,t + β3 Size i,t + β4 Leverage i,t + β5 ROA i,t + β6 OCFi,t+ εi,t (3) 
where 
Pre_Restructuring: 1 if a firm had implemented preemptive corporate restructuring, and 0 otherwise. 
AQ: accounting information quality, discretionary accruals according to the modified Jones model 
(1991) as described in Equation (2).      
Size: firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets of firm at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Leverage: leverage ratio, the book value of debt scaled by the total book value of assets. 
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ROA: Return on Assets , net income scaled by the total book value of assets. 
OCF: operating cash flow, operating cash flow from cash flow statement scaled by the total book value 
of assets. 
The dependent variable, preemptive corporate restructuring (Pre_Restructuring), is a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if a firm had implemented preemptive corporate restructuring, and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variable, accounting information quality (AQ), is discretionary accruals according to the 
modified Jones model (1991), as discussed in Section 3.2. 
I include four control variables, size (Size), leverage (Leverage), Return on Assets (ROA) and 
operating cash flow (OCF). I define firm size as the log transformation of the total assets. I control for 
leverage in the model, measuring it as total liability divided by assets. I define ROA as the ratio of net 
income divided by assets and OCF as the ratio of operating cash flow from cash flow statement divided 
by assets. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics resulting from hypothesis testing. Panel B of Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of preemptive corporate restructuring firms and Panel A of Table 2 shows that of 
control firms. The mean and median values of the accounting information quality (AQ) for preemptive 
corporate restructuring firms are 0.0128 and that for control firms are 0.0035 respectively meaning that 
accounting information quality of preemptive corporate firms is higher than that of control firms. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. All firms  
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
AQ 1482 0.0081  0.0119  0.1214  -0.4128  0.3707  
Size 1482 27.2398  27.1386  1.9839  22.9749  30.5326  
Leverage 1482 1.2295  0.8381  1.3436  0.0206  7.0970  
ROA 1482 0.0137  0.0304  0.1239  -0.5755  0.2710  
OCF 1482 0.0439  0.0411  0.0888  -0.2446  0.3347  
Panel B. Preemptive Corporate Restructuring Firms 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
AQ 741 0.0128  0.0182  0.1319  -0.4128  0.3707  
Size 741 27.2391  27.1421  1.9823  22.9749  30.5326  
Leverage 741 1.2243  0.7166  1.4239  0.0206  7.0978  
ROA 741 -0.0028  0.0239  0.1447  -0.5755  0.2710  
OCF 741 0.0339  0.0333  0.0866  -0.2446  0.3347  
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Panel C. Control Firms 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
AQ 741 0.0035  0.0067  0.1099  -0.4128  0.3707  
Size 741 27.2406  27.1317  1.9868  22.9749  30.5326  
Leverage 741 1.2347  0.9279  1.2592  0.0206  7.0978  
ROA 741 0.0303  0.0372  0.0960  -0.5755  0.2710  
OCF 741 0.0538  0.0502  0.0900  -0.2446  0.3347  
AQ: accounting information quality, discretionary accruals according to the modified Jones model 
(1991) as described in Equation (2), Size: firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets of firm at the 
beginning of the fiscal year,  
Leverage: leverage ratio, the book value of debt scaled by the total book value of assets, 
ROA: Return on Assets, net income scaled by the total book value of assets,  
OCF: operating cash flow, operating cash flow from cash flow statement scaled by the total book value 
of assets. 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations. The likelihood of preemptive corporate restructuring.is 
negatively correlated with return on assets (ROA) and operationg cash flow (OCF). 
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 AQ Size Leverage ROA OCF 
Pre_Restructuring 0.0382 -0.0003 -0.0038 -0.1333*** -0.1118*** 
AQ  0.0944*** 0.0129 0.1061*** 0.26*** 
SIZE   0.139** 0.1684*** 0.1506*** 
Leverage    -0.2636*** -0.1970*** 
ROA     0.4049*** 
1) Pre_Restructuring: 1 if a firm had implemented preemptive corporate restructuring, and 0 otherwise. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2.  
2) *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
 
4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis  
Table 6 reveals the results of the logistic regression analysis based on the estimation in Equation (3) 
related to hypothesis, which examines the higher the accounting information quality of the firm, the 
higher the likelihood of preemptive corporate restructuring. As predicted in hypothesis the coefficients 
of accounting information quality (AQ) are positive and significant at the 1% level. This result suggests 
that the higher the quality of accounting information, the more proactive the corporate restructuring. In 
other words, the quality of high accounting information is a determinant of preemptive restructuring. A 
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company needs preemptive restructuring in order to solidify its value, even if it is not financially in a 
difficult position. Such preemptive restructuring, which is essential to the entity, is avoided by the 
management’s agent problem and also results in a delay or failure to complete the corporate 
restructuring process due to disagreement over valuation of the assets to be sold between purchase firm 
and sale firm. However, this result shows that entities with a high quality of accounting information 
tend to carry out more preemptive restructuring because of their effective monitoring role and easier 
valuation of the assets sold. 
  
Table 4. Financial Reporting Quality and Preemptive Corporate Restructuring 
Pre_Restructuringi,t = β1 + β2AQi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4OCFi,t + β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + εi,t  
 
Coeff. Wald Chi-Square 
Intercept -0.8305 1.2356 
AQ 1.3091 7.8349*** 
Size 0.0396 2.0222 
Leverage -0.1005 5.5201** 
ROA -2.2074 17.2271*** 
OCF -2.3054 10.9883*** 
N 1482(741+741) 
R2(%) 3.13% 
1) Pre_Restructuring: 1 if a firm had implemented preemptive corporate restructuring, and 0 otherwise. 
Other variables are defined in Table 2. 2) *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In the past, companies attempted to invest heavily in expanding the size of companies through mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) for economies of scale. Recent companies, however, are focusing on 
optimizing their size through corporate restructuring such as selling assets, selling subsidiaries and 
selling noncore affiliates to focus their corporate capabilities. Therefore, even before financial 
difficulties are faced, a company should be able to actively attempt preemptive voluntary restructuring 
to improve its operating performance and its financial structure. The revitalization of corporate 
restructuring is also a desirable direction in terms of revitalizing the local capital market. This study 
showed that high quality of accounting information was required as a determinant that could enhance 
the practicability of preemptive restructuring, which is essential for the long-term survival and growth 
of the enterprise. I hope that the results of this study will provide an opportunity for an entity to 
continue to strive for high quality accounting information. 
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